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ABSTRACT
This paper directs attention at the globalization of knowledge and knowledge creation as the fundamental
global driver of economic outcomes in today's information economy.  It documents the globalization
of knowledge and spread of scientific research from advanced to developing countries and argues
that these developments undermine trade models in which advanced countries invariably have comparative
advantage in high tech goods and services; determine the immigration of skilled workers; boosts labor
standards; and influences incomes and inequality within and across countries.  To the extent that knowledge
is the key component in productivity and growth, its spread and creation is the one ring of globalization
that rules the more widely studied patterns of trade, capital flows and immigration, per my title.
Richard B. Freeman
NBER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA  02138
freeman@nber.org  From the 1980s to the 2010s, globalization was a major driver of economic change worldwide.  
Analysts and policy-makers debated the rules for international economic transactions and their effects 
on workers and living standards, focusing on what I will call the “three rings of globalization under the 
economic sky”: trade of goods and services, international flows of capital, and immigration. The fall of 
the Soviet Empire, China's move to a market-based economy, and the adoption of export-oriented 
growth strategies by India, Latin America, and other developing countries altered all three flows in 
major ways.  World trade increased relative to GDP as global treaties reduced tariffs and related 
barriers and as developing countries led by China turned into major exporters along global supply 
chains.  International capital flows increased at unprecedented rates.  High skilled immigrants moved 
across country lines in increasing frequency and low skilled often undocumented workers and refugees 
kept the number of immigrants increasing as well.  Far from being substitutes, in this period trade and 
flows of factors of production were, if anything, complements.
1   
  Advocates of globalization argued that free trade would improve the economic lives of workers 
in all countries.  Some believed that capital flows would also improve economic well-being, though 
even ardent free traders expressed concerns over the instability of international capital flows
2.  Critics 
of globalization argued that trade without international labor standards would lower the well-being of 
less skilled workers in advanced countries and create a race to the bottom in labor standards in 
developing countries.  In ensuing years some outcomes diverged from what advocates promised and 
others diverged from what critics feared, but viewed as a project to bring the bulk of humanity into a 
single market-oriented economic system, globalization succeeded famously.     
  Without downplaying the role of trade, capital, and immigration in altering employment, wages, 
and working conditions around the world, in this paper I direct attention at an aspect of globalization 
that has a potentially more important impact on economic life in today's information economy: the 
globalization of knowledge and knowledge creation.   
                                                           
1For analyses of goods and factor flows as complements see Markussen (1983) and Wong(1986). 
2Bhagwati (1998) was particularly outspoken against international capital mobility.   My analysis unfolds in two sections.   
  Section one presents evidence that the globalization of higher education in the form of rapidly 
increasing university enrollments worldwide and even greater proportionate increases in international 
students has altered the locus of the key determinant of modern economic growth – the knowledge base 
for production, and has globalized the production of scientific research in ways that were unimaginable 
a short while ago. 
  Section two argues that the globalization of knowledge has wide-ranging effects on economic 
activity and labor worldwide.  By moving developing countries closer to the production possibility 
frontier, it undermines the “North-South” model of trade that positions the comparative advantage of 
advanced countries in their dominance of high value added goods and services at the frontier of 
technology; affects the immigration of skilled workers; boosts pressures for higher labor standards; and 
influences the level of incomes and inequality within countries and across the globe.  To the extent that 
knowledge is the key component in productivity and growth, its spread and creation is the one ring that 
rules them all of my title.   
1. Globalization of Knowledge and Knowledge Creation 
  The rapidity with which developing countries expanded their higher education systems and 
graduated huge numbers of workers in science, engineering and technology, and moved toward the 
frontier of science and innovation is one of the great surprises of the era of globalization. 
  Exhibit 1 records the number of students enrolled in tertiary education (college or university, 
including two year colleges) in developing and advanced countries from 1970 to 2010, based on data 
from UNESCO.  In 1970 although developing countries constituted about 80% of the world population, 
they had 54% of university enrollments.   As a result of the destruction that the Maoist cultural 
revolution wreaked on China's educational system, China had less than 300,000 college and university 
students. The other population giant India had 2.5 million students.  Among advanced countries, the US 
was the pioneer in mass higher education. Although the US had about 6% of the world population, in 1970 twenty-nine percent of college or university students were American.  Many other advanced 
countries had begun expanding their higher education systems in the 1960s but did not reach the US-
level of mass higher education until the 1990s.    
  By 2010, the division of university students and graduates around the world had changed 
markedly.  Developing countries had over three-quarters of university students. China enrolled 30 
million students and graduated 5-6 million persons with university degrees, many in science and 
engineering.  India was slower in expanding its higher educational system but still enrolled 21 million 
persons in 2010 and more than doubled the number of Indian Institutes for Technology from 1970 to 
2010s.
3 Other developing countries also invested heavily in university education, building new 
universities and expanding older ones.  For example, the International Association of Universities 
(IAU) listed 82 institutions of higher education for Bangladesh in 2012 compared to the dozen or so 
that existed in the 1970s. – This growth came about through the entry of many private universities as 
well as  public institutions.  Similarly the IAU reports that Chile had 90 universidads and Instituto 
Profesionals in 2012, which compares to 16 in the 1970s.
4  By the early 2000s many advanced 
countries attained similar or higher rates of enrollment of persons of the relevant age in college and 
university than the US. Still, the share of tertiary students in advanced countries beyond the US began 
trending down as the advanced country share of world population fell and as developing countries 
increased enrollments rapidly.  The US share of enrollments was 11% in 2010 and shrinking. 
  At the highest level of academic training, there was a similar pattern of globalization as many 
countries invested in doctorate programs.  China increased the number of graduating PhDs in the 
natural sciences and engineering to exceed the number in the US in 2007 (though it fell short of the 
total science and engineering degrees due to much larger numbers of social science PhDs in the US).  
Among the European countries, Sweden graduated more S&E PhDs per person in the relevant age 
                                                           
3The six that existed in 1970 grew to 16 by 2012.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Institutes_of_Technology 
4http://www.iau-aiu.net/sites/all/files/b_nw.pdf#Bangladesh  and Chile. The figures for the 1980s are from Freeman, 
2010a: Richard B. Freeman,” What Does Global Expansion of Higher Education Mean for the US?”  in Charles Clotfelter 
(ed) American Universities in a Global Market  University of Chicago downloadable at 
http://papers.nber.org/books/clot08-1 group than the US while the EU overall graduated nearly twice as many natural sciences and 
engineering PhDs as did the US.
5  Indeed, the number of American citizens getting PhDs did not 
change much in the 1990s and 2000s. What maintained US doctorate production were international 
students, who earned about one third of the PhDs in science and engineering in 2009 and accounted for 
over half of engineering, computer science, and physics doctoral degrees. 
  To be sure, the quality of higher education in developing countries that were rapidly building up 
their universities and increasing enrollments fell below the quality of higher education in advanced 
countries.  In Shanghai's Jiao Tong University ranking of universities 190 of the top 200 universities 
were Western (with five of the ten non-Western in the top 200 in China, including 2 in Hong Kong). 
And while the US share of degrees fell, US universities maintained their position as global leaders in 
higher education, holding  40% of the top hundred and 37% of the second hundred in the Shanghai 
ranking.
6  The London Times Higher Education ranking of universities shows a similar pattern with 93 
advanced country universities in its top 100, and 43 in the US.
7 
  More relevant for the labor market, McKinsey's 2006 study of the supply of graduates around 
the world (published as Farrell, 2006) 
found that the recruiters of Western firms viewed only 13% of university graduates from 28 low wage 
countries, including China, India, and Brazil, as “suitable to work in a multinational company”.  The 
recruiters based their assessment on English language skills, cultural fit, and location near major 
centers with international airline connections.  These factors could, however, be irrelevant to national 
firms operating in those countries, and even 13% of tens of millions of graduates creates a huge pool of 
talent for jobs at the multinationals.
8  As McKinsey did not ask the recruiters the proportion of 
graduates from Western colleges and universities that met the standards of the multinationals, 
moreover, it is difficult to assess relative quality from these data. 
                                                           
5National Science Board (2012), table 2-35 
6http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2012.html# 
7http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013/reputation-ranking 
8  Diana Farrell,  Offshoring: understanding the emerging global labor market, Harvard Business School 
Press, 2006 p 14-15   In any case, the educational standards of universities in lower income countries will surely rise 
over time as newly developed or expanded institutions upgrade their faculties and improve their 
academic practices.  In addition, students throughout the world will benefit from the newest technology 
in higher education – the Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) that major US universities have 
developed and make available free over the Internet.
9 Anyone in the world with Internet access can 
now take courses given by leading professors at major universities for free and obtain a certificate for 
completing the course and passing an exam. The two big university level MOOCs are consortia: 
Coursera (https://www.coursera.org/), which describes itself as a social entrepreneurship company that 
partners with the top universities in the world to offer courses online for anyone to take, for free; and 
EdX, an on-line consortium which includes Harvard and MIT, among other universities.  EdX had 
about one million students in its first year of operation, with over two-thirds outside the US.  Indicative 
of the reach and impact on the globalization of education, in spring 2013 Amol Bhave, a 17-year-old 
from Jabalpur, India, who took MIT's EdX circuits and electronics course over the Internet, was 
accepted at MIT for regular study on the basis of his performance.  The goal of EdX is to educate one 
billion people around the world in the next ten years.
10 
  Finally, while relatively few students obtain higher education outside of their own country, the 
number of international students is the fastest growing part of the global higher educational system.  
Exhibit 2 shows a near seven-fold increase in the number of international students between 1975 and 
2010, producing a growth rate about three times as fast as that for all tertiary education students.  In the 
US, the two top supplying countries for international students were China and India.  International 
students are particularly important among the PhDs whose research underpins the scientific and 
technological base for modern industry and are a major source of supply for immigrant scientists and 
engineers. 
                                                           
9 See http://www.moocs.co/Higher_Education_MOOCs.html  for a listing of the massive open on-line courses in 
higher education. 
10  Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson “Online courses open doors for teenagers,” Financial Times, March 26, 2013 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c5a4b932-924c-11e2-851f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UdebusFD   Measuring the globalization of R&D investments is a trickier business because the cost of 
research varies greatly among countries depending on the wages of researchers and other expenses.  A 
country in which researchers are paid 1/2 as much as in another country could spend half as much for 
the same real activity.  In the absence of R&D specific exchange rates, the US's National Science 
Foundation (NSF) uses purchasing power parities to compare expenditures across countries in 
comparable units.
11 Such data show that until the 1990s advanced countries performed the vast bulk of 
R&D but that in the 1990s and 2000s, China and some other developing countries had made huge 
inroads into global R&D activity.  In 2009 the United States accounted for 31% of global R&D, down 
from 38% in 1999 and down from 40%-45% of global R&D in the early 1970s.  China was the second 
biggest performer of R&D, accounting for 12% of global R&D
12 while Japan accounted for 11%.  The 
largest EU performer Germany spent 6% of global R&D but the EU in its entirety accounted for 23%.  
With several Asian countries beside China and Japan increasing R&D expenditures substantially and 
with Brazil increasing its R&D, the concentration of R&D in the US and a few other advanced 
countries declined noticeably.  Battelle (NEED YEAR and ADD TO BIBLIOg –  
Do NOT NEED, FOOTNOTE 12 IS THE REFERENCE) predicts that China will outspend the US 
in R&D by 2023.
13  Another way to contrast R&D around the world is to compare R&D to GDP.  The 
ratio of R&D to GDP are high for some smaller countries such as Sweden, Finland, Switzerland in 
Europe, Israel in the Mideast and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in Asia.
14   
  The proof in the pudding for academic research and basic R&D is in the scientific papers that 
the research produces.  Exhibit 3 shows that the number of scientific papers in the world doubled over 
the near thirty years covered in the table.  The globalization of research can be seen in the changing 
                                                           
11 See NSF Purchasing Power Parities: Preferred Normalizer of International R&D Data 
 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind93/chap4/doc/4s293.htm 
12The revision of China's PPP exchange rate in late 2007 lowered the dollar value of its R&D expenditures, but this 
reduced the rate of increase of its share of world R&D rather than reducing it. 
13 Grueber Martin and  Tim Stud  The Internationalization of R&D, R&D Magazine 12/17/2012 
http://www.rdmag.com/articles/2012/12/internationalization-r-d report  Battelle’s prediction.  
14All of the data except for the early 1970s estimate of the US share of global R&D are from the NSF Science and 
Engineering Indicators, table 4-19.  The 1970s estimate is from National Science Board (1993), which only reports data for 
the major OECD countries, US, Japan, Germany, UK, Italy, and Canada.    shares of papers for different countries or groups of countries.  With an increased number of 
universities with faculties engaged in scientific research, growth of PhD and other S&E researchers, 
and R&D spending, the developing countries raised their share of papers from 17.6% in 1981 to 27.1% 
in 2009, largely at the “expense” of the US share of papers, which fell from 35.9% to 26.5%.  Among 
the developing countries, the biggest increase was for China, which produced almost no papers in 1981 
and 9.4% of all papers in 2009.  The Nordic states share of papers far exceeds their share of the world 
population but fell modestly as scientific production shifted to Asian developing countries. 
  Science has increasingly become a team activity, in which specialists with different skills and 
knowledge work together, often with complicated equipment, to make discoveries, leading to 
substantial increases in the number of authors on scientific papers in virtually every field.
15 Exhibit 4 
shows the increasing trend in co-authorship and in international co-authorship in all articles in the 
world and in US academic articles. In the data for the world the proportion of co-authored papers with 
an international author increased from 22% in 1990 to 35% in 2010
16.  In the US essentially all of the 
increase in co-authorship took the form of increased international co-authorship.  Much as 
multinational firms use a global chain of production which combines the activities of persons in many 
countries, scientists increasingly rely on the work of persons of other nationalities and in other 
locations to produce their papers.  Attributing papers to particular countries, as national science 
agencies do, gives a misleading picture of the actual process of scientific activity.  Finally, in 2010, the 
most important collaborative relation in scientific work was between China and the US.  Thirty percent 
of Chinese collaborations occurred with Americans and 14% of US collaborations occurred with the 
Chinese. 
17 
  In short, the evidence for globalization of knowledge and its production is overwhelming.  What 
are the implications for the well-being of workers and economies writ large around the world? 
                                                           
15 Wuchty S, Jones BF, Uzzi B. The increasing dominance of teams in production of knowledge.Science. 2007 May 
18;316(5827):1036-9. Epub 2007 Apr 12. 
16 Calculated by taking the proportion of international co-authored papers divided by the proportion of all co-
authored papers, as shown in the Exhibit. 
17US NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2012, Appendix table 5-41  
2.Impacts of Globalization of knowledge and knowledge production 
  Globalization of knowledge has wide-ranging effects on production and labor worldwide.  To 
the extent that knowledge is a key factor in production, the spread and creation of knowledge is critical 
to economic development, comparative advantage, the flow of labor and capital among countries, and 
the spread of labor standards and norms about worker rights.  Operating with or through the other rings 
of globalization, the spread of modern technological knowledge has arguably contributed to increased 
inequality within countries as well as to the convergence of income per capita among countries. 
  Consider first the impact of the globalization of knowledge and of research and development on 
the competitiveness of workers in advanced and developing countries.  Debates over trade treaties and 
intellectual property rights highlight the importance of higher level education and of the ability to 
create new technology in advanced countries as providing comparative advantage compared to 
developing countries and protecting workers from low wage competition.   
  In the 1990s debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), NAFTA 
advocates told Americans that Mexico would get labor-intensive industries with “bad jobs” that did not 
require much education while the US would get high tech industries with good jobs for well educated 
workers.   As long as US workers maintained their years of schooling edge over Mexicans the US 
workers had nothing to fear from lower wage labor in Mexico.  This view of a permanent education 
edge as protecting US workers from competition has been undermined by the rapid growth of higher 
education in Mexico and developing countries worldwide and by the ability of firms to outsource the 
work of the highly educated along global value chains  
  In the 1990s-2000s debate over the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS)
18 advanced countries sought to protect the patents, copywrites, and 
discoveries of the firms that developed new products and processes.  The “North-South” or life cycle 
                                                           
18http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm product model of trade develops the consequences of such protections for labor (Krugman, 1979). This 
model attributes the higher earnings of workers in advanced countries relative to the earnings of 
otherwise similar workers in developing countries to the advanced country monopoly of R&D-induced 
technological change and  production of technologically advanced goods and services.  Firms pay 
workers more in the advanced North because the latest technology makes workers more productive 
than workers using older technologies in developing countries.  The advanced country/developing 
country wage differential depends on the rate of technological advance in the North relative to the rate 
of imitation of technology in the South.  Jones and Ruffin(2007) analyze the effects of technology 
transfer, which is a form of imitation of technology, on advanced countries under more complex 
conditions. 
  Globalization of knowledge and knowledge creation obsolesces this model. To the extent that 
technological development depends on the absolute number of scientists and engineers or other highly 
educated workers rather than the ratio of such specialists to less skilled workers, highly populous 
developing countries with large numbers of S&E workers can compete with advanced countries in high 
tech sectors.  If China has 100,000 engineers working on green technology and France has 10,000 
engineers, China is more likely to advance that technology than France.  When multinational giants 
such as IBM and Microsoft first expanded research activities in China or India, their decisions made 
headlines.  By the early 2010s, the availability of highly qualified workers at low cost had made it 
commonplace to locate research facilities in developing countries.
19  With global production chains 
dispersing production worldwide, some analysts argue that the location of manufacturing in developing 
countries will itself lead to greater R&D in those countries, as firms find that R&D is more efficient in 
                                                           
19  Between 1997 and 2008 the share of U.S.-owned affiliates R&D performed in China, South Korea, Singapore, and 
India rose from a half percentage point or less to 4% for China, just under 3% for South Korea, and just under 2% each for 
Singapore and India.  Over roughly the same period, majority-owned affiliates of foreign MNCs located in the United 
States  total business R&D has fluctuated narrowly between 13% and 15%. National Science Board (2012), close proximity with the manufacturing facility.
20  This reverses the causality on which the North-
South model is built.  Manufacturing attracts R&D rather than R&D attracting new manufacturing. 
  The evidence that globalization of knowledge has outrun the North-South model can be found 
not only in the greater dispersion of R&D facilities worldwide described earlier but also in increased 
production and exports of high-tech products in developing countries (subject to the caveat that global 
supply chains make it difficult to assign products to countries).  Panel A of Exhibit 5 shows a sizable 
shift in value added in knowledge and technology intensive industries from the US, EU, and Japan to 
the rest of the world between 1990 and 2010.  With its huge investments in higher education and R&D, 
China made a particularly large gain in its share of value added in the knowledge and technology 
intensive sectors.  Panel B of Exhibit 5 shows an even greater shift in exports in high-tech goods from 
the US, EU, and Japan to other countries.  Again China increased its share the most.  In 2008-2009 the 
Obama Administration viewed green technologies as a way to restore US manufacturing jobs but soon 
discovered that China had become the leading place of production in some areas of solar technology.
21 
Immigration of highly skilled and less skilled workers 
  Almost by definition developing countries have a surfeit of unskilled workers relative to other 
factors of production compared to advanced countries, and pay those workers less than they could earn  
if they worked in advanced countries.  Accordingly, large numbers of less skilled workers migrate from 
Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and Latin America to the US, many without documentation.  
Similarly, advanced Europe is the destination of many less skilled workers from Eastern Europe, the 
Maghreb, and other parts of Africa.  Such immigration helps balance factor proportions among 
countries, consistent with Hecksher-Ohlin patterns of trade. 
  The surprise in immigration is that many highly skilled workers also migrate to advanced 
countries, adding to the imbalance in factor proportions via “brain drain”.  Underlying this flow are 
                                                           
20Pisano, Gary and Willy Shih,  2012; Isabel Tecu,  2013   
21Wikipedia, List of countries by photovoltaics production 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_photovoltaics_production) shows China share of solar photovoltaics 
production from less than 1% in 2000-01 to over 40% in 2010, while the US share fell from nearly 20% to 4-5%.  The 
quality of Chinese solar panels has created some problems, however (Woody, Todd, 2013). large wage differences across countries of workers with the same skills (Freeman and Oostendorp, 
2000) that presumably result from the superior infrastructure and productive knowledge in advanced 
countries.   International students are a major source of this migration.  Students build job market skills 
and connections in the country in which they study that makes immigration easier.  Some countries, 
such as Canada and Australia, give visas on the basis of skills, with Australia advantaging persons who 
obtain Australian degrees.  In the US, over half of foreign-born science and engineering workers with a 
bachelor's degree, and over 2/3rds of foreign-born master's and PhD scientists and engineers obtained 
their highest degree in the US (Freeman, 2010b, table 5).  Migration of highly educated workers to 
advanced countries strengthens their comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors and reduces the 
incentive of multinationals to invest in R&D or other skill-intensive activities in developing countries. 
  While outflows of educated workers can create substantial skill shortages for small Caribbean 
islands, Central American, or African countries, the movement of educated persons from highly 
populous developing economies to advanced countries is unlikely to have much adverse effects on the 
source country.  The number of migrants is modest compared to the increased numbers graduating from 
universities in those countries.  With six million new university graduates every year and 28,000 new 
S&E PhDs in China and with many Chinese getting doctorates in other countries, the loss of tens of 
thousands of bachelor's graduates or of hundreds of PhDs migrating to advanced countries barely slows 
the rapid increase in the pool of highly educated workers.   
  The migration of skilled immigrants to advanced countries has, moreover, advantages to 
developing countries.  Some immigrants return to their birth countries with greater skills and income.  
Some move regularly between their birth countries and country of immigration, creating “brain 
circuluation” rather than brain drain (Saxenian, 2005).  Studies of the flow of knowledge, largely based 
on the location of persons who co-patent, suggest that immigrants work with persons in their birth 
country to produce and pass knowledge quickly through ethnic networks (Kerr, 2008; . Agrawal, 
Kapur, McHale and Oettl (2011),), which could compensate for the immigrant inventing products or processes overseas.  Ethnic networks are also connected with trade flows ( Rauch and Trindade 
(2002);Epstein and Gang (2004); Felbermayr et al  2010)  and with multinationals forming new 
affiliates in countries (Foley and Kerr, 2013), expanding manufacturing in those areas (Kerr, 2008) and 
in future foreign direct investment (Kugler and Rapaport, 2007).  The co-movement in skilled labor, 
trade and capital create unexpected economic outcomes in part because extant models do not explicitly 
treat the information and knowledge flows that are part of those movements. 
The pressures of trade on wages and employment 
  The great fear of globalization critics was that increased trade between advanced and 
developing countries would adversely affect low skill workers in advanced countries and pressure 
developing countries to lower labor standards as they competed to attract foreign investments.   
  Since unskilled labor is the relatively scarce factor in advanced countries, that trade would 
reduce unskilled wages relative to skilled worker wages fits with standard trade theory and pressures 
toward factor price equilibrium with trading partners.  During the NAFTA debate, however, treaty 
advocates denied that trade would harm workers and dismissed factor price equilibrium as theoretically 
“far more frail than currently imagined” (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1993, p 8) and rejected factor content 
evidence that trade reduces the wages of unskilled workers by increasing their implicit supply.
22  As 
trade with developing countries has grown, particularly with China, this position has become untenable.  
Comparing local labor markets more or less affected by Chinese imports to the US, Autor, Dorn and 
Hanson (2012) find that greater import pressures increase unemployment, lower labor force 
participation, and reduce wages  with parameters that “explains one-quarter of the contemporaneous 
aggregate decline in U.S. manufacturing employment”.   Diverse studies of the effect of offshoring find 
both wage and employment effects on workers, usually with evidence from the US.
23The result is not 
                                                           
22 Similarly, proponents of free trade rejected as unrealistic Samuelson's (2004) argument that developing country 
innovation in the products in which an advanced country specializes could shift comparative advantage to harm the 
advanced economy and ignored Gomory and Baumol's (2000) simulations of situations in which one country's gain in 
trade came at the expense of the other.  There is no compelling evidence on the possible magnitude of these effects. 
23  Robert C. Feenstra, 2011 summarize findings from over a dozen studies in his section on offshoring, wages and 
employment.   NAFTA opponent Ross Perot's “giant sucking sound”of jobs leaving advanced countries from trade,
24 
but pressures toward factor price equalization that show up in job displacement (which translates into 
lower wages on new jobs for the affected workers) as well as reductions in relative wages of workers in 
trade-impacted areas.    
  In the 1990s-2000s the challenge to the factor proportions analysis of the effect of globalization 
on labor markets has come from an different quarter: “The 1990’s dealt a blow to traditional 
Heckscher-Ohlin analysis of the relationship between trade and income inequality, as it became clear 
that rising inequality in low- income countries and other  features of the data wereinconsistent with that 
model.   As a result, economists moved away from trade as a plausible explanation for rising income 
inequality... a number of new mechanisms have been explored through which trade can affect (and 
usually increase) income inequality ...within-industry effects due to heterogeneous firms; effects of 
offshoring of tasks; effects on incomplete contracting; and effects of labor-market frictions.” (Harrison, 
et al 2010, p 1).  As an example of the more subtle analysis necessary to explain patterns in the data 
Amiti and Davis (2009) differentiate between falls in tariffs on outputs and falls in tariffs on inputs on 
the wages of workers in firms in different positions in the the chain of production. 
 
  The increase in skill differentials in developing countries with abundant unskilled labor
25 is 
mindful of the Leontief Paradox: the finding that in the aftermath of World War II (and later) the 
capital rich US exported labor-intensive products while importing products that were capital-intensive.  
Part of the explanation seems to lie in the greater education or human capital that American workers 
had over workers in other countries in the period (Keesing 1966; Kenan, 1966) and part also to 
                                                           
24http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_sucking_sound 
25 The increase in inequality is not found in all developing countries nor consistently over time in the same country.  For 
instance, Brazil and several other Latin American countries saw income inequality decline in the 2000s, due apparently 
to redistributive policies.   But skill premiums increased in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Mexico in the 1980s 
and 1990s as trade increased (Pavcnik, 2011, p 238) differences in knowledge, with US exports concentrated in R&D and knowledge-intensive activities 
and imports coming from sectors with less knowledge-based activity (Keesing, 1967).   
  Could the globalization of knowledge and knowledge creation have contributed to the increased 
inequality in developing economies in the 1990s?  Since increased supply of graduates in developing 
countries operates to reduce labor market inequality, any knowledge-based explanation must rest on the 
impact of the supply of graduates and R&D on modes of production that benefitted skilled labor versus 
unskilled labor.  That rapid increases in GDP per capita in developing countries did not expand 
employment in manufacturing and other formal sectors enough to reduce the share of workers working 
informally in developing countries suggests that transfer of technology and knowledge may have 
played a role.  Cross section data show a strong inverse relation between the informal sector share of a 
work force and GDP per capita that implies that in the past, economic development reduced 
employment rapidly in the informal sector. .  But in the 1990s-2000s the share of the work force in 
developing countries barely changed, making the informal normal. (Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009).  The 
growth of global value chains – the fragmentation of production of goods and services into parts and 
tasks that could be offshored to many different countries – may also have changed the nature of 
globalization (OECD, 2013) in ways that benefitted skilled workers in developing countries relatively 
to unskilled workers in the informal sector.   
  Without gainsaying the 1990s increase in income inequality in some developing countries with 
globalization, evidence that income inequality fell in the 2000s in some of the same countries, 
including 12 of 17 Latin American (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011) also leaves open the possibility that 
the puzzle could be more about a temporary decadal phenomenon than about a longterm relation.   
effects on labor standards 
  The greatest fear of critics of globalization was that globalization would set off a race to the 
bottom in labor standards as developing countries competed to attract foreign investment and boost 
exports.  Egregious cases of low standards among subcontractors to multinational firms such as the worker suicides at Foxconn (subcontractor to Apple) and the 2013 collapse of the  eight-storey Rana 
Plaza factory building in Bangladesh that killed over one thousand employees of subcontractors for 
major garment firms
26 notwithstanding, however, globalization tended to improve rather than reduce 
labor standards around the world. 
  Why? One important factor was the spread of information about labor conditions that 
galvanized consumer pressures against bad working conditions.  “Human rights vigilantes” – activists 
devoted to improving labor conditions in developing countries – succeeded in getting some brand name 
firms to monitor suppliers, to improve conditions, to identify suppliers so that the activists could 
independently monitor how their suppliers treated workers, and to develop codes of conduct for 
themselves and their subcontractors (Elliot and Freeman, 2005).  Developing countries enacted 
protective labor legislation and signed the ILO's conventions on labor standards (Elliot and Freeman, 
2003).  In 2007 China enacted a new Contract Labor Law, which pressured firms to give written 
contracts to migrant and other workers and to pay legally required social insurance.  Brazil increased its 
resources for implementing labor law.  Pressed by unions and activists, the US, Canada, and some other 
advanced countries put labor standards clauses into trade clauses. 
  Examining the efforts of human rights and anti-sweatshop activists to improve 
working conditions and raise wages for workers in Indonesia, Harrison and Scorese concluded that 
”firms touched by the global market place were more, not less, likely to comply with labor standards 
(due in part) to … pressure imposed by the United States, which used the GSP as a mechanism to 
enforce labor standards in Indonesia, combined with increasing human rights activism”(Harrison and 
Scorse, 2003, p 80).  But they also note that while “activism significantly improved wages for unskilled 
workers in sweatshop industries, (it) probably encouraged some plants to leave Indonesia.” (Harrison 
and Scorse, 2004, introduction).  The job of the activists is to balance improvements in wages and labor 
conditions against the risk of job loss or plant closure from their campaigns Overall, the activists 
                                                           
26http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22476774 appear to have succeeded in doing this.  In their review of job accident rates, child labor, and violations 
of civil rights in Asia, and the linkage between foreign direct investment and labor regulations among 
all countries, Flanagan and Khor (2012, p 280) concluded that “a broad improvement in working 
conditions and labour rights around the world accompanied a significant expansion of international 
trade and investment.”
27 
Conclusion 
  The globalization of economic activity that has spread the benefits of modern technology 
around the world and helped improve living standards in traditionally low income countries produced 
some unexpected changes in the labor market and economy writ large.  Globalization was accompanied 
by a huge spread of knowledge and knowledge creation that influenced factor flows, productivity, and 
comparative advantage.  It created some difficult adjustments for workers in both developing countries 
and advanced countries and produced worldwide pressures for better labor standards rather than 
creating a race to the bottom in standards.  While globalization of knowledge and knowledge creation 
may not be the key factor underlying the effects of globalization on labor, per my one ring analogy, the 
evidence in this paper has hopefully convinced the reader that the spread of knowledge is on par with 
the more widely studied trade, international capital flows, and immigration in determining outcomes 
and can help explain some otherwise puzzling patterns in the effects of globalization on labor. 
 
 
                                                           
27 They stress the importance of growth of GDP in improving standards  rather than the role of activists in effectuating 
change and note that immigration also places pressures on countries to improve standards as workers will migrate 
from countries with low standards to those with higher standards.  
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 Exhibit 1:  Millions of Enrollments and Shares of enrollment (in parentheses) in Tertiary 
Education, by Area of the World, 1970-2010 
 
Area  1970  1980  1990  2010   
World  29.4  55.3  67.6  177.6   
Developing  16.0 
(54%) 
35.0 (63%)  41.0 
(61%) 
136.5 (76%) 
 
 
      China  <0.1  1.7  3.8  30   
      India  2.5  3.5  5  20.7   
US  8.5 
(29%) 
12.1 (22%)  13.7 
(20%) 
20.4 (11%) 
 
 
Other adv  4.9 
(17%) 
8.2 (15%)  12.9 
(19%) 
23.7(13%)   
Source: UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, on line files,2010 from tables 15, 20A   
 Exhibit 2: International Students Fastest Growing Part of Higher Education 
 
year  Int'l Students, World 
 
1975       600,000 
1980       800,000 
1990     1,200,000 
2000     1,900,000 
2010     4,100,000 
 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2012 p 24 and IIE, International Students and Mobility    
http://exchanges.state.gov/universitysummit/mobility_report.pdf 
 
 Exhibit 3: Numbers of Scientific Papers in World and Percentage of papers by country, 1981-2009 
 
Area  1981  2009 
World  369,000(100
%) 
788,347 (100%) 
Developing  17.6  27.1 
      China  0.3  9.4 
      India  3.2  2.5 
     South Korea  0.2  2.8 
US  35.9  26.5 
Other advanced  46.5  46.4 
  Nordic Countries   3.6  3.1 
 
Source: 2009,  National Science Board (2012), table 5-27, available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/tables.htm. 1981, National Science Board (2006), table 5-32, 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind96/chap_5.pdf Exhibit 4: The Move to International Coauthorships Exhibit 4: The Move to International 
Coauthorships 
Data for this exhibit are below: 
 
 World and U.S. academic S&E articles coauthored domestically and internationally: 1990–
2010 
(Percent)                   World articles    U.S. academic articles 
Year 
Domestic 
coauthorship 
only 
International 
coauthorship 
All 
coauthorship   
Domestic 
coauthorship 
only 
International 
coauthorship 
All 
coauthorship 
1990  32.72  9.52  42.24    42.84  11.71  54.56 
1991  33.42  10.64  44.06    43.24  12.91  56.15 
1992  33.71  11.43  45.14    43.18  14.01  57.20 
1993  33.99  12.37  46.35    42.80  14.85  57.66 
1994  34.38  13.12  47.50    43.05  15.77  58.82 
1995  35.19  13.93  49.12    43.40  16.61  60.01 
1996  35.73  14.67  50.41    43.49  17.55  61.04 
1997  36.28  15.62  51.90    43.52  18.49  62.01 
1998  36.63  16.26  52.90    43.12  19.62  62.74 
1999  37.10  17.14  54.23    43.02  20.74  63.77 
2000  37.42  17.69  55.11    42.91  21.68  64.59 
2001  38.11  18.64  56.76    43.01  22.90  65.91 
2002  38.59  19.24  57.83    42.94  23.74  66.68 
2003  39.32  19.75  59.07    43.39  24.41  67.80 
2004  40.08  20.09  60.17    43.61  25.10  68.71 
2005  40.75  20.43  61.17    43.72  25.61  69.33 
2006  41.24  20.87  62.11    44.07  26.25  70.32 
2007  41.89  21.62  63.51    43.87  27.77  71.64 
2008  42.24  22.15  64.39    43.80  28.84  72.63 
2009  42.96  23.10  66.07    43.66  30.39  74.05 
2010  43.42  23.83  67.25    43.28  31.57  74.85 
 
 
  
Exhibit 5: Distribution of Knowledge and Technology-Intensive Industries and of Exports of  
High-Technology Goods by country, 1990-2010 
Panel A: Percentage of Global Value Added in Knowledge and Technology-Intensive Industries 
  1990  2010 
US  35.1  32.5 
EU  33.8  27.8 
JAPAN  13.4  8.9 
        Total  82.3  69.2 
China  1.5  6.8 
Asia-8  3.4  5.9 
All other countries  11.8  18.1 
 
Panel B: Percentage of Global Exports of High-Technology Goods 
  1995  2010 
US  15  11.6 
EU  31.9  28.9 
JAPAN  15.1  5 
        Total  62  45.5 
China  7.6  23.7 
Asia-8  21.6  20.6 
All other countries  9.8  10.2 
 
Source: National Science Board (2012), Appendix table 6.1 and 6.24 